编者按：7月17日，伦敦政治经济学院（LSE）会计系麦克菲（Richard Macve）教授到访上海国家会计学院。麦克菲教授毕业于牛津大学，后在毕马威会计师事务所任职。1979年至1996年，在阿伯里斯特威斯大学任教并任会计系主任。后加入LSE，并于两年前退休。他还曾任ICAEW技术委员会副主席。

麦克菲教授的研究领域涉及财务报告、会计历史，并对中国的会计及行业管理历史情有独钟，与我国会计界多有来往。作为中国会计视野网“会计口述历史”项目采访的受邀人，他接受了李扣庆院长的采访。

现刊发全文如下：

Li: Thank you. It’s really a great pleasure to have you here. We have a program which is called Oral History of Aounting. We want to document the history of aounting, especially in China. I looked at your background, and you partially retired from London School of Enomics and Politics in 2011. And some people say as a distinguished professor in aounting, your whole life is mmitted in aounting, so uld you please brief us a little bit on your career, your academic life?

李院长：谢谢。您的到访是我们的荣幸。我们有一个“会计口述历史”项目，我们想记录会计史，尤其是中国的会计史。我看了一下您的背景。您于2011年从伦敦政治经济学院部分退休了。正如某些人所说，作为会计领域的一名杰出教授，您的一生都献给了会计。那么能否请您向我们简要介绍下您的职业生涯，尤其是您的学术生活？

Macve: OK. Thanks. Well, yes, I think aounting, as they say, is in the family genes. My father is a chartered aountant, and now my elder son is a chartered aountant, so three generations. And I started work after the university with Peat Marwick Mitchell (which is now KPMG) in London. And I was there for about six years. I had begun to do some part-time teaching at the London School of Enomics, 2 or 3 hours a week, because they like to have people me in from outside. And then after a year or two, they asked if I would like to join the faculty. By that time I had got quite interested in finding out about the academic aounting. Maybe it uld explain some of the things we did in practice, answer some of the questions about: “Why do we do this?” “Why do we do that?” So I joined the LSE and I was there for about 5 years, and then I was offered a chaired professorship at the University of Aberystwyth in Wales. And I went there in about 1979 and was there until 1996. Then I came back to LSE till I retired two years ago. But I am still teaching there part-time.

Macve教授：好的，谢谢。是的，我认为正如他们所说的，会计就存在于我们的家族基因里。我的父亲是一名特许会计师，现在我的大儿子也是一名特许会计师，因此我们家祖孙三代都是。大学毕业后，我在伦敦的毕马威开始了我的职业生涯，在那做了大概六年。然后我开始在伦敦经济学院做兼职教师，一周上两三小时课，因为他们希望有外面的人来上课。这样做了一两年后，他们问我是否愿意加入他们的师资队伍。到那时，我已对会计学术领域非常感兴趣，也许它能解释我们在实务中的一些问题，回答为什么要这样做，为什么要那样做。因此我就加入了伦敦政治经济学院，在那里待了五年。然后，威尔士的阿伯里斯特威斯大学给了我教授的职称，于是我就于1979年去了那里，在那一直待到1996年。然后我又回到伦敦政治经济经济学院，直到两年前退休。但是我还继续在那里干着。

Li: Quite interesting. You have a family gene in aounting. And you started your career from an aounting firm, then move to academic life gradually. You found some issues when you did practical work in aounting. Then you go to the academic world try to figure out the answer to those questions.

李院长：很有意思。您有会计的家族基因。而且您的职业生涯是从会计事务所开始的，然后才逐步转入学术界。您在做会计实务工作时发现了一些问题，然后转向学术界去寻找这些问题的答案。

Macve: Yes. For example, I think one of the audits I was on was an elevator manufacturer. When you me to do the end-of-the-year figures, if you think some of the ntracts are going to make a loss, you have to write them down. But there are other ntracts which still look as though they will make a profit, so why can’t you put them together, and say, “You know, overall, our set of ntracts is still profitable.” And this is a mmon question in aounting.

It’s the same with oil wells. Do you treat each oil well as an individual item and write it off if there is no oil. Or you say, “No, we’ve got a field of ten oil wells. Some will be suessful, and some won’t. But as long as we have some suessful ones, they will pay for everything.” So you don’t need to write down if you got enough ming from the suessful ones. So this is a big argument in oil aounting which has been going on forever. And it doesn’t look yet as though it is going to be resolved.

So these are the kind of things I uldn’t understand: “Why do we do it this way?” “Why do we do that way?” And nobody uld answer it except to say, “That is what we did last year, so we always do it like that.” So I thought maybe if I uld spend some time on academic study, I would find some more answers to that.

Macve教授：是的。举个例说，我过去曾在某家电梯制造企业工作。当你做年底的各类数字时，如果你觉得某些合同要亏损，你得进行减记。但是还有其他合同看起来似乎还会盈利。那么你为什么不把这些合同进行合并，然后说，“总体而言，我们的合同仍然是盈利的。”这是会计上的一个常见问题。

油井也是如此。你是把每个油井当作一个单项来处理，如果不产油的话就进行勾销呢？或者，你会说，“不，我们这个油田有十口油井。有些会产油，有些不会。但是只要我们有几口能产油的油井，他们就能抵消掉一切成本。”因此，如果产油的油井能带来足够的盈利的话，你就无需减记了。这是石油会计领域长久以来一直存在的一个大争论。而且似乎还得不到解决。

这都是些我不能理解的事情。我们为什么要这样做，为什么又要那样做呢？没有人能回答这个问题，除了说，“我们去年是那么做的，因此我们一直那么做。”因此我想，如果我能花些时间做做学术研究，或许我就能找到这些问题的答案了。

Li: I guess this kind of background, practical experience, plus academic research, for you, definitely is quite different from other purely academicaly originated professors.

李院长：我想，像您这样，实务经历加上学术研究的背景，一定使您与其他纯学术导向的教授显得不同。

Macve: I’ve always kept in touch, because the Institute of Chartered Aountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), they asked me to be their Academic Advisor, because they have some research funds which were left by a rich chartered aountant. So each year they have to decide which projects to support. So for nearly 20 years, I was their Advisor. I didn’t make the decisions. I just advised the research mmittee on what I thought was the appropriate decision. Sometimes they agreed with me, sometimes they didn’t. But it was quite interesting, because it meant I got to know lots of research from lots of different researchers, and then you began to learn who are the good ones and who are the ones that are maybe not good, you know.

Macve教授：我一直在与业界保持联系，因为英格兰及威尔士特许会计师协会（ICAEW）邀请我担任他们的学术顾问。有一名有钱的特许会计师给他们留了一笔科研经费，因此每年他们都要决定来赞助哪些项目。过去二十年来，我一直是他们的学术顾问。我不需做任何决定。我只需向研究委员会推荐我所认为妥当的决定。他们有时和我看法一致，有时不。但是这件事情很有趣，因为我能从很多不同的研究者手中了解到很多研究项目，然后你就会逐渐了解到哪些是好项目，哪些不好。

Li: So that means actually even after you move to academic life, to those leading aounting and business schools, you still keep very close ntact with the industry?

李院长：这就是说，即便您转向学术领域，在顶级会计和商学院工作之后，您仍然和业界保持着紧密联系？

Macve: Yes. And also particularly with the life insurance industry in Britain, which is very old, goes back to about the middle of the eighteenth century. So there I got to know the actuaries as well, the actuarial profession, and I wrote quite a lot about the insurance aounting methods. And then maybe 10 or 15 years ago, they made me an honorary actuary. I am an honorary fellow of the Institute of Actuaries. So I have two professions that I’ve spent time with, the chartered aountants and the actuaries.

Macve教授：是的。尤其是和英国的人寿保险业。这是一个历史非常悠久的行业，可以追溯到18世纪中期。因此我也认识了精算师和保险精算这一行业，写了很多关于保险会计方法的论文。大约十至十五年前，他们让我成为了一名荣誉精算师。我是英国精算师学会的荣誉会员。因此我这一生主要和两个行业打交道，一个是特许会计师，一个是保险精算师。

Li: I know most recently you have shifted at least part of your research to China, or issues related to China, especially the history of aounting and auditing in China. uld you please tell me why you choose to study these, because as you mentioned there are so many issues to be studied. But at this stage, why do you choose to focus on China-related aounting issues, especially the history of aounting in China and what are the major findings have you made so far?

李院长：据我所知，近期您已将您的研究重心部分转移到了中国，或者跟中国有关的问题上，尤其是中国的会计和审计历史。正如您所说，有这么多的问题值得研究，那您为什么选择研究与中国有关的会计问题，尤其是中国的会计史？目前您取得的研究成果有哪些？

Macve: Well, I think everybody is interested in China, you know. If what the experts say is right, China uld be the biggest enomy within the next ten years. And that’s going to affect all of us, not just China. So there are lots of—it seems to me, because I do aounting history, and I’ve looked at the UK and the US particularly, that some mparisons are there as to how things have changed. And obviously, at one time the UK was the most powerful enomy in the world. Then the Americans beme the most powerful enomy in the world. So if China will be the most powerful enomy in the world, then we need to understand how the Chinese system works. And my friends at LSE who are enomic historians of China, increasingly, their view is that, until the foreign powers came in 1840/1850, China was a very suessful enomy (Li: in the world) at the level of mercantile activity (but not in the Industrial Revolution: that had not happened yet). So now we are interested in how people ran their suessful businesses in China. And luckily, one of my lleagues at LSE, and a friend who works for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, they have disvered an archive of aounting rerds running from about 1790 to 1850, before the foreign powers came. So this is very interesting, how they did their aounting. You know, we have got their original books written with Máobǐ, very very interesting. So we have been looking at them. And it seems quite clear that they are able to run their aounts very suessfully without the western double-entry bookkeeping system. And that in turn is quite important, because a lot of people still argue, including quite eminent historians, that it was the double entry system that enabled the western untries—first in Italy, in 1300/1400s, and then it spread to other parts of Europe, and then it became very widely used because of the industrial revolution—to be so suessful, and that without double entry bookkeeping you cannot have capitalism. That is the argument. Well, the Chinese evidence suggests you can have very suessful capitalism without the double entry system. This is quite an interesting finding, you know. We haven’t finished the work yet, but some other archives are beginning to turn up of businesses from the Qīng period. So that’s one thing that I am looking at. We are nearly ready to submit a paper, and I’ve presented it at Tsinghua last week. And we have presented it in other places as well.

And then the other thing is, well, a long time ago, about 1990, I had a student, who was a student in aounting in Xiamen. And he came when I was at Aberystwyth, and he wanted to do a PhD. For some reason, his father had a friend at Aberystwyth and he wanted him to go there. So he came to me and said, “Can I do a PhD?” And I said, “Well, first you must do a master’s degree.” He did that on management aounting, because he had a Chinese ernment scholarship and they wanted people to find out about management aounting. That is the most important thing, they thought. But while he was with me, he developed an interest himself in what is happening in auditing, because at that time, they were just beginning to take auditing away from state ntrol into private firms. So people who had been in the Ministry of Finance became auditing firms, or professors became auditing firms. And at the time there was also the rival body from the National Audit Office. Their people were also making audit firms. So there were actually two institutes for a while, the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Aountants, which we still have, and another one which was the China Institute of Certified Auditors. And he interviewed lots of people in China, which was a new thing to do in China in those days, as most people just did their research from books, you know. Then we wrote a paper about it. Obviously, I am not saying it was because of us, but Premier Zhu Rongji (Li: the founder of this institute) had the same idea, he said, “This is stupid. We can’t have two institutes for auditors. We must have one institute for auditors.” So it was merged into the CICPA. So that was the first time I became interested in auditing in China.

And then about three or four years ago, there was a student from SUFE, who was visiting Cardiff University in Wales in Britain, and I met her at a nference. She gave a paper about what is happening to the audit firms now in China, and the Ministry of Finance’s plans for developing the Chinese auditing industry. So I said to her, “you don’t want to spend a year at Britain sitting at a mputer doing equations. You are going to meet some people.” She was a bit surprised. Anyway, through my ntacts in the profession, we got to interview some of the senior partners, the chairman of Deloitte and other people. And we have been asking them what they were doing about China. And similarly Dr. Zhang Weiguo, who you know was in SUFE and is now in IASB, he arranged meetings for us to meet people in China, some very important people, so we got some interviews with them as well.

There were quite a lot of people who were saying in Britain that the next “Big N” firm will be a Chinese firm. This is a bit surprising, you know. So I think it depends on what you mean by a “Big N” firm. It’s quite clear, I think, just because of the size of China, you can have the biggest aounting firm in the world just in China. But what people mean by “Big N” firm really is international firm. So that is a bit more difficult, because if you are a Chinese firm and you want to persuade a big British mpany you should be their auditor, there is obviously a large reputation gap at the moment between you and the “Big 4” international firms. So the question is: “How are the Chinese firms overming this need to build their reputation?” There are different models. A very popular model is that once the firm bemes a good size in China, they join one of the so-called send tier works like BDO lìxìn, PKF and RSM/ Crowe Horwath, and they have worldwide works. But each firm is kind of independent within the work. The Ministry of Finance seems to quite like this, and so does the CICPA, because the Chinese firm keeps its identity while beming part of an international brand. There are some firms like ShineWing whose strategy seems to be grow from the Chinese base and start to follow their clients overseas. As their clients invest overseas in Africa, Europe, maybe they will start to open offices there, just like the Big 4 firms did a hundred years ago when the American and British firms went overseas.

The other thing is what has happened to the Big 4 firms themselves, because two years ago, 2012, their licenses were due for renewal, which were joint venture licenses. The Ministry of Finance says, “We don’t need these anymore. This was a special circumstance when we started and we had to keep foreign expertise. But now these firms must beme Chinese firms. In other words, Chinese CPAs must beme the people who are the partners and managers of these firms.” I think it would happen anyway, because for most of the big firms, that’s what they do all around the world, you know. In France, all the partners of KPMG are French now. When I was young, they were mostly British. But they all had a plan to localize. And I think probably the Big 4 firms here were not able to be that tough. Partly the Ministry of Finance thought they were being too slow, you know, and give them a bit of kick two years ago, and say you must have, some majority percent of the partners must be Chinese CPA. That’s happening now.

Macve教授：我想每个人都对中国感兴趣。如果专家们所料不错的话，未来十年，中国将是世界上最大的经济体。其影响将覆盖到所有人，不止中国自身。我是做会计史研究的，我主要研究了英国，还有美国的会计史的演变，并做了些对比。大家都知道，英国曾经一度是世界上最强大的经济体，然后美国成为世界上最强大的经济体。因此，如果中国将成为世界上最强大的经济体的话，我们需要对中国的体制机制有所了解。

我在LSE有专门研究中国经济史的朋友。他们的看法是，在1840/1850年外国列强进入中国之前，就商品活动而不是工业革命的水平而言，中国是（世界上）非常成功的经济体。工业革命那时尚未发生。但是现在，我们对如何在中国成功运营企业感兴趣。

幸运的是，LSE的一个同事和在北京的中国社科院工作的一个朋友，他们发现了从1790年到1850年间，在外国列强进入中国之前的一个会计账簿档案。他们是如何做账的，我们认为很有意思。我们找到了他们用毛笔书写的原始账簿，非常非常有意思。我们正在对他们进行研究。似乎很明确的一点是，没有西方的复式记账制度，他们也能成功地记录他们的账目。这一发现也非常重要，因为很多人，包括非常著名的史学家，仍声称是复式记账法使得西方国家，首先是意大利，在十四十五世纪，然后随着工业革命的成功而广泛传播到欧洲其他地方，他们认为没有复式记账就没有资本主义。而中国的证据表明，没有复式记账制度也可以成功地发展资本主义。这个发现很有趣。目前我们的工作尚未结束，但是也发现了其他一些来自清朝时期的工商业档案。这就是我当前正在研究的东西之一。我已经准备好就此提交一篇论文了，上周我刚在清华大学演讲过这篇论文，还在其他地方演讲过。

还有一件事就是，很久以前，大约在1990年时，我有一个来自厦门的学生，他是会计领域的一个出类拔萃的学生。当我在阿伯里斯特威斯大学任教时，他想跟我攻读博士学位。出于某种原因，他的父亲有一个朋友在阿伯里斯特威斯，因此他想他去那儿学习。于是他找到我，问可否读我的博士。我说，首先，你必须读一个硕士学位。于是他读了管理会计的硕士，因为他获得了中国政府的奖学金，而政府希望大家去多多了解管理会计，他们认为这是最重要的事情。但是在他跟着我的时候，他自己萌发了对审计领域的兴趣。那时，人们正在将审计从原先的政府控制变成私营企业。因此，我们看到在财政部工作的人，成立了审计事务所，或者教授成立审计事务所。那时还有来自国家审计署的人也在成立审计事务所。因此曾经一度有两个协会。中国注册会计师协会（CICPA），现在还存在着。另一个就是审计师协会。他在中国采访了很多人，这在那时还是一种新的研究方式。那时的人们还仅限于从书本中进行研究。然后我们就写了一篇关于此事的论文。当然，我并不是说正是因为我们，但是当时的朱镕基总理也同样认为，他说，“这种做法不合适，我们不能有两个审计师协会，只能有一个。”因此审计师协会被并入了CICPA。那就是我第一次对中国的审计问题感兴趣。

大约三四年前，有一个来自上海财经大学（SUFE）的学生，在英国威尔士的卡迪夫大学访学。我们在一次会议上认识。她在会上讲述了一篇论文，关于现在审计事务所在中国的情况，以及中国财政部发展中国审计行业的计划。于是我跟她说，“你不该在英国一整年都坐在电脑前做模型。你应该出去认识些人。”她有点吃惊。但是，通过我在这个行业的人脉，我们采访了一些高级合伙人、德勤的董事会主席等人。我们问他们在做哪些跟中国相关的事情。同样还有张为国博士，你知道他曾经在SUFE工作，现在在国际会计准则理事会（IASB）任职。在他的安排下，我们认识了一些人，一些非常重要的人，因此我们也对他们进行了采访。

在英国有很多人在说，继四大之后的下一个大型事务（Big N）将是一个中国事务所。这有点让人吃惊。我想这取决于你对大型事务所的定义。很显然，正因为中国的规模，中国就能有全世界最大的会计事务所。但是人们所说的大型事务所其实是指国际性事务所。这个目标实现起来难度更大一点，因为如果你是一个中国的事务所，你想说服一家大型的英国公司聘请你做他们的审计师，很显然目前你和四大国际事务所相比，在声誉方面还有很多差距。因此，问题就是中国事务所如何克服困难建立声誉。有很多种模式。其中一个很流行的模式就是，一旦事务所在中国发展到一定规模以后，他们加入某个所谓的国际二线事务所，例如BDO立信、PKF、RSM和Crowe Horwath，然后就有了全世界的事务所关系网。但是在这个关系网内每个事务所相对独立。财政部以及CICPA的人似乎都很喜欢这种方式，因为这样中国的事务所既保持了其身份，又成为了国际品牌的一部分。还有一些事务所，比如信永中和，它的战略似乎是在中国本土发展壮大，然后跟随其客户在非洲、欧洲等地进行海外投资的步伐，开始在海外设立办事处，就像四大会计事务所一百年前跟随美国公司和英国公司海外扩张时一样。

还有一件事就是四大会计事务所近些年来自身的发展情况。两年前，即2012年，他们的“合作”都已到期，本土化转制。财政部说，“我们不需要这些合资的许可了，这是最初我们需要引进外资和外国技术时的特殊情形。但是现在这些公司必须变成中国公司。换句话说，中国的CPA必须成为这些事务所的合伙人或经理。”我想这件事总归会发生的，因为绝大多数的大型事务所在全球都是这么做的。在法国，毕马威的所有合伙人现在都是法国人。在我年轻的时候，他们大部分都是英国人，但是他们都有本土化的计划。我想也许四大事务所并没有那么强悍。一方面，财政部觉得他们动作太慢了，于是两年前就推了他们一把，说你的合伙人中必须有一定比例的中国CPA。这也正在实现。

Li: Aording to what you say, actually MOF China is following international practice to grow the CPA industry in China. And the future of Chinese CPA firms is quite promising. But possibly there are different pathways and also different kind of difficulties they must face in the future.

李院长：据你所说，中国财政部实际上是遵循国际惯例在发展中国的CPA行业，而且中国会计事务所的未来前景非常光明。但是也许还有其他不同的路径，以及未来不得不面对的其他挑战吧？

Macve: I mean part of the difficulty, I think, as you would expect, is China’s aounting standards are still Chinese aounting standards, but they are almost the same as IFRS. And the ernment said the long term plan is to nverge with IFRS. China has already 100% adopted the International Auditing Standards. But one has to aept, for somebody who uld have started out as a state auditor 25, 30 years ago, it’s quite hard to learn what this means, this new way of doing things. So it may take, you know, a generation. The younger ones are OK. They can learn very fast and understand. But for anybody who is certainly my age, as an old saying goes, “you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.” So it will take a little bit of time, I think, for people to understand what these standards mean in Chinese ntext. But it will me. Everybody says it will me. It is just the question of how long it takes. And then once the Chinese firms can say we operate with exactly the same standards as any firm around the world, then you know their reputation should beme much more credible. So very interesting times.

Macve教授：我想困难之一就是，如你所预料的，中国会计准则仍然是中国的会计准则，但是他们几乎和国际会计准则（IFRS）一样。中国政府称其长期目标是与IFRS趋同。中国现在已百分之百地采纳了国际审计准则。但是可以理解的是，对于25-30年前就开始从事审计工作的人来说，这些国际准则的内容和这些新的做事方式学起来很难。因此可能得花上一代人的时间。年轻一代没问题。他们学得很快，理解力强。但是对于我这个年龄段的人来说，正如一句老话所说，“你不能教老狗新把戏”。因此得花上一段时间才能让人们理解这些准则在中国的语境下的意义。但是这一天终会到来的。每个人都说这一天会到来的，只是时间问题。一旦中国事务所可以说我们用与世界上其他任何一家事务所都一样的准则运营，他们的声誉就会变得更可信。因此我们现在处于非常有趣的时期中。

Li: Recently as you mentioned, our Ministry of Finance, especially our Finance Minister, Minister Lou, pays a lot of attention on the development of management aounting. He believes China should work more on the management aounting. And I noticed that you have also done some research on the management aounting. People always have some argument between financial aounting and management aounting. So we would like to have your mment on the relationship between financial aounting and management aounting, and also how do you see China pay more and more attention on management aounting nowadays?

李院长：正如你所说，最近我们的财政部，尤其是我们的财政部长，楼部长，非常重视管理会计的发展。他认为中国应该在管理会计方面下更多功夫。我注意到你也做了一些关于管理会计的研究。而在管理会计和财务会计方面总存在争议。因此我们想听听您如何看待财务会计和管理会计二者之间的关系，还有您如何看待中国现在越来越重视管理会计？

Macve: Well, as we were saying the other day, President Li, I think the problem is that the split has me when originally they were the same thing. As I say if you read Luca Pacioli on double entry bookkeeping, it’s written for the businessman for the help of running business. And of urse for a long time, most businesses were privately financed, by friends, family or whatever. Then during the late 19th century, you began to get stock market investment. And then you get this requirement, obviously, that mpanies present their aounts to investors. But even then initially the kind of model that we have in the UK and mostly ntinental Europe as well, these aounts were presented at the annual meeting where the shareholders attended and can ask questions. If you are not running it very well, you know, then when there will be a motion to re-elect the board of directors they might say, “No, we don’t like this board of directors because they are not doing a good job.” So in a sense the same information is needed to run the business as a manager and to explain to your shareholders how well you are doing. But then gradually, obviously as stock markets have grown in importance, you get what are called “passive investors”, and now you get, you know, very, very short-term investors who might hold the shares for two sends in high-speed trading. The emphasis has shifted particularly in America, where the regulation of aounting is really directed by the Securities and Exchange mmission (SEC), and their job is to make sure share prices are fair. So you get this totally different emphasis, which is you want to know what the value of a business is, not necessarily how well managers are running it, although these two are obviously related. And that seems to have led to this split, particularly in America, between management aounting and financial aounting. And it’s made worse in the academic area because our young academics are told they must publish four papers in five years. It is a lot easier to sit in front of a mputer and run some regressions on financial aounting data and stock market data than it is to go and interview managers to find out how they do things—observe. Now some people are doing that, they are doing that kind of work.

But it’s fairly unusual and in America now there is very little management aounting research. This is a great pity, because at the end of the day, I think if people—and I used to say this when I was an auditor—if they are just producing figures for somebody outside who they know nothing about, they don’t have any real interest in the figures. While if they have to give figures which are based on what they themselves are using for making decisions, then those figures are going to be much more relevant and reliable. Obviously there is a danger they will lie. But you know that is human nature. You try and ntrol it with internal ernance and audits and other things. So I think there needs to be a re-focus of the research onto the management aounting.

And I think probably the more interesting developments in financial aounting will me from new ways of thinking about the management aounting. I mean, take for example, Prof. Hiroshi Okano’s interest now in the amoeba, a system that Kazuo Inamori used at Kyocera and at Japan Airlines. If you read what Inamori says, it has wonderful things like, “management is like aounting, double check everything, make sure your profits are good.” So although the system works by the way which it incentivizes the amoeba groups, by the end of the day you are going to have a headline number. And he has got American stock exchange investors in his mpany, so he has to report these financial aounting numbers, but those numbers are going to be much better if they me out of a system, like amoeba system where people are kind of living the numbers every day as part of their incentives and ntrol systems that are within the groups, and link to the management strategy, you know. So there shouldn’t be a nflict between them.

There are obvious problems, particularly in our history, because of the legal liability, you know. If you give out numbers which then turned out not to be right, somebody will sue you for a lot of money, and say, “it’s your fault that I lost money in your mpany.” Whereas if you can hide behind the aounting rules, so you will just give the numbers that the aounting rules say you have to give, then it’s very difficult for people to attack you. So we get such lawsuits in the UK, but in fact very few of them are suessful, unless it is obvious fraud. If you can show that there is obvious fraud, then there is a liability. And I think the liability issue in China is still quite low, though it probably will increase with the stock market expansion. So I think it is important and I think the Ministry of Finance is quite right in this respect. What is important to mpanies is not just good financial aounting. It’s more good management aounting. The tail of—we have an expression, “the tail wagging the dog when it should be the dog wagging the tail”. So management aounting is the dog and financial aounting is the tail. It should be the dog wagging the tail, but recently it’s the tail that has been wagging the dog. And that is not good.

Macve教授：李院长，正如前一天我们所谈到的，我认为问题是这二者割裂开来了，而追溯其源头，他们其实是同一事物。如果你读卢卡•帕乔利关于复式记账法的论述，它是为企业经营者更有效经营管理企业而写的。当然，在过去的很长一段时间，大多数的企业都是通过私人筹集资金的，通过朋友、家人等等。从19世纪晚期起，我们开始有了股票市场投资。然后就有了公司将其账目向投资人列报这一要求。但是即便如此，最初我们在英国以及大部分欧洲大陆的模式是，在股东参加并能提问的年会上进行账目列报。如果你经营得不是很好，就会有一个动议要求重新选举董事会。他们会说，“我们不喜欢这届董事会，因为他们工作做得不好。”因此在某种程度上，无论是作为一名经理来经营企业，还是向股东解释你的经营情况，都需要同样的信息。但是之后，由于股市的发展，就有了所谓的被动投资者，现在还有极短期的投资者，那些在股票高速交易中只会持有股票两秒钟的投资者。

在美国，重心完全转移了，会计规则实质上是由证券交易委员会指导的，而证券交易委员会的职责是保证股票价格公平合理。因此重心完全不一样了，即你想知道的是企业的价值，而不是企业的经营管理，尽管这两者明显相关。这似乎就导致了管理会计和财务会计之间的分裂，尤其是在美国。在学术领域，情况更加糟糕，因为根据有关规定，年轻的研究人员必须在五年内发表四篇论文。要坐在电脑前对财务会计数据和股市数据进行回归分析并不容易。你需要走出去对公司经理进行采访，找出他们是如何做事的，观察很重要。现在在中国有些学者在这样做。但是现在在美国，却很少有关于管理会计的研究，这实在有点不同寻常。我觉得这真是很可惜，因为在一天结束之际，我认为如果公司的管理层只是在为外面的他们并不认识的人提供一些数据的话，他们对这些数据不会有真正的兴趣。当我还是一个审计师的时候我经常这么说。如果他们给出的数据本身就是要供他们自己做决策参考使用的，那么这些数据的相关度和可靠度会高很多。当然也存在风险，经理人可能会撒谎。但这是人的本性，你可通过内部治理、审计等加以控制。

因此，我认为对管理会计的研究需要重新定位，对管理会计的新思考也会激发财务会计研究的新趋势和新进展。举例说，冈野浩教授现在的研究兴趣是阿米巴，即稻盛和夫在京瓷和日本航空里实施的管理体系。如果你读稻盛和夫的相关著述，他有很多精彩的话，如“管理就想会计，需要仔细核对各个事项，确保盈利可观。”尽管阿米巴这个体系很有效，能激励组织，到一天结束之际，你总会得出一个关键的数据。有一些美国的股票投资者投资于他的公司，因此他必须要汇报这些财务会计数据。但是如果这些数据是从一个体系，如阿米巴体系里出来的话，数据的质量要高得多。在阿米巴体系内，人们每天都会留下数据，这是组织内部的激励与控制手段之一，也和高层的管理战略相关联。因此，他们不存在管理会计与财务会计的冲突。

在我国历史上，出于法律责任界定的原因，存在很多问题。如果你给出的数据结果被证明都有误，有人会起诉你赔一大笔钱，说“正是因为你的错误使我在你的公司上亏了钱。”如果你能躲在会计规则背后，那么我们只需按照规则给出数据，并且说按照规定我们不得不给，那么就很难有人攻击你了。因此我们在英国的诉讼案中，很少有诉讼成功的，除非是明显的欺诈。如果你能指出明显欺诈，那就要负法律责任。我想这种责任问题在中国发生的比例还很低，尽管随着股市的扩张，很有可能会上升。因此我认为，中国财政部重视管理会计这一做法是非常正确的。对公司最重要的，不是好的财务会计，而是好的管理会计。我们有一个说法，应该是狗摇尾巴而不是尾巴摇狗。因此管理会计是狗，财务会计是尾巴。应该是狗摇尾巴，但近些年来却是尾巴在摇狗。这种状况可不好。

Li: Absolutely, aounting should play a more active role in supporting the operation, the value creation, not just reporting the value, right? Reporting the outme or output? You mentioned very few professors are working on doing some research on management aounting area in US. How about the case in UK and in the Europe?

李院长：会计应该在支持管理运营、企业价值创造，而不仅仅是价值或结果报告上，发挥更积极的作用，对吗？你提到在美国很少有教授在做管理会计领域的研究。那么在英国和欧洲情况又如何？

Macve: Yes. I think there are more, relatively speaking. I mean there are some in the US. It’s not mpletely black and white. But the most famous ones are in financial aounting. And to some extent, the UK has been pying that because again people want to publish in the American journals. And we also have pressures in the UK now. We have what’s called the Research Assessment Exercise by the ernment every five or six years, and you have to have four good papers, international papers, if you are to be regnized as a researcher. So the pressure is very very high, especially on young people. And now many of the Chinese business schools are doing exactly the same thing. You know, you go to Beida, they give you a list, and if you do not get on the list, they are not interested. SUFE the same, and I think, Tsinghua, they are all the same. They all say: “We must get into the American journals, because…” I assume there is pressure from Ministry of cation, “…we want China to have universities in the ten, like in the UK and America”, you know. And the only way they can see to do it is to get people with American, UK, and European PhDs to me and write those kinds of papers. But I don’t think it is helping China very much. Myself. Myself.

Macve教授：是的。相对来说，（英国和欧洲的）要多些。这并不是非黑即白的问题。我的意思是在美国有一些研究管理会计的人，但是最著名的研究人员都在财务会计领域。在某种程度上，英国也在照搬这种模式，因为人们想在顶级的美国杂志上发表论文。现在我们在英国也有科研压力，即所谓的科研评估实践（Research Assessment Exercise，今年起更名为卓越研究框架，Research Excellence Framework），政府每隔五到六年评估一次。你得在国际刊物上发表四篇高质量的论文，才能被评定为研究员。因此压力是非常大的，尤其是对年轻人来说。现在中国的很多商学院也在做同样的事情。如果你去北大，他们会给你一份清单，如果你没有在清单上发表过论文的话，他们就不感兴趣。上海财大也是如此。清华等等都一样。他们都说，“我们必须要在美国期刊上发表文章，因为……”我猜他们也有来自教育部的压力，希望中国的大学能进入全球前十，就跟英国和美国的大学一样。他们觉得唯一的实现途径就是请从美国、英国、欧洲获得博士学位的人来中国任教并写那些论文。但是我不觉得这对中国有多少助益。仅代表我个人观点。

Li: It is really a kind of dilemma. On one side, you see from the need of various mpanies, definitely they need management aounting. (Macve: exactly) On the other hand, the criteria system in the universities, at least we can make an easy judgment, that kind of criteria doesn’t enurage research on management aounting. So there is a need, but there is a barrier.

李院长：这确实是一种困境。一方面，你看到来自各种企业的需求，他们确实需要管理会计。另一方面，至少我们可以得出一个简单结论，高校的评判标准和制度并不鼓励管理会计研究。因此，一边是需求，一边却是障碍。

Macve: Yes, I guess the other barrier is language, you see. If you write a paper that is mainly statistics, you can do that whether you are a Chinese or an American and you can get a friend that is smart enough to do it in English. But if you write a qualitative paper, that is discussing ideas, what the people you’ve interviewed think about things, you’ve got to then write it in very good English, not just passable English, but very good English. I think personally that he best strategy, and it is happening already, is for Chinese researchers and European and American researchers to work together. I mean the work I am doing on Chinese history, I uldn’t do it, I can’t read the Chinese aounts, but my Chinese lleagues can. And I know how the aounting works, so we can discuss it. On the auditing project, when some of the people we have interviewed don’t really speak English, we give them the questionnaire in Chinese and my lleague from SUFE will explain to them what we were doing. And then we two discuss it together, you know, and work out what we think we found out. I think that is probably the most productive path for these next few years, is for Chinese scholars and the European or the American scholars to work together on projects, because the Chinese probably understand the West quite well now, but they don’t have the same facility to mmunicate. The westerners don’t understand China, so they need to be made to understand.

Macve教授：是的。我想还有一种障碍就是语言障碍。如果你写一篇主要是统计数据的论文，不管你是中国人还是美国人，你总能找到一个朋友帮你用英语做出来。但是如果你写的是一篇定性研究的论文，旨在探讨一些想法，你所采访的人的想法，那你得用非常好的英语写出来，不仅仅是过得去的英语。我个人的看法认为最好的策略是，让中国的研究人员和欧美的研究人员共同合作。这已经在发生了。比如说，我当前所从事的关于中国会计史的研究，单凭我一个人是做不了的，因为我读不了中国的账簿，但是我的中国同事能。而我知道会计是如何发生的，因此我们可以一起讨论。至于我所从事的审计项目，当我们所采访的一些人不会说英语时，我们会给他们一份中文的调查问卷，我的上海财大的同事会向他们解释我们所做的事情。然后我们会一起讨论，共同得出我们的研究结论。我想这可能是未来几年最富成效的研究路径了，即让中国的学者和欧美的学者共同参与项目研究，因为现在中国对西方国家可能已经非常了解了，但是他们却不具备同等沟通的能力。而西方人不了解中国，因此他们需要通过合作增进对中国的了解。

Li: So actually we need operation across untries, and also across industries, maybe.

李院长：因此我们需要跨越国界和跨越行业的合作。

Macve: Yes, Yes, very much. But it’s not going to be easy. It requires some far-sighted people to say that just getting a paper into The Aounting Review is not the end goal of mankind.

Macve教授：的确如此。但是不容易实现。这需要一些具有远见卓识的人告诉大家，仅仅在《会计评论》上发表论文并不是人类的最终目标。

Li: Yes, maybe to some extent, you need to change the criteria, at least for some kind of research institutes or universities.

李院长：是的，或许在某种程度上，还需要改变评判标准，至少对某些类别的研究院或者高校来说是这样。

Macve: Yes, exactly. I mean everybody needs to have their own mission for their own kind of institute. There’s no point you mpeting directly with Tsinghua. You are never going to be Tsinghua. But you uld be the best aounting training institute in the untry. And you probably already are.

Macve教授：是的，没错。我的意思是每个人都要为他们自己的院校制定自己的使命。你们跟清华直接竞争是没有意义的，你们永远成为不了清华，但是你们可以是中国最好的专注于会计培训的学院。可能你们已经是了。

Li: We still have a long way to go. This mes to my last question, professor. Based on your over 40 years’ experience working in the aounting sector as a practitioner, as a distinguished professor, what kind of advice do you have for China to further promote its development in aounting department or in aounting sector. And of urse I would really appreciate it if you can give us some advice on how we can speed up the development of Shanghai National Aounting Institute in a right way. Of urse I also would like to ask for your advice for our young people working in aounting profession, what kind of suggestion or advice you uld give to them based on your personal experience.

李院长：我们还有很长的一段路要走。这也到了我的最后一个问题，教授。基于您40多年在会计实务领域以及会计学术领域工作的经历，您对中国进一步推动会计部门或会计行业的发展有什么建议？当然，如果您能对我们如何以正确的方式加快上海国家会计学院的发展提供一些建议的话，我将感激不尽。最后，我还想请您对从事会计行业的年轻人提供一点建议。根据您的个人经历，您能为他们提供哪些建议呢？

Macve: Well, sometimes I think you have to regnize that you know the experiences that I’ve had may not be so relevant now because the world has changed so fast and is still changing extremely fast. Nevertheless, I think a basic issue is sometimes people distinguish positive research and normative research. They say normative research is just giving opinions about what you think is a good idea, no evidence at all, while positive research is about what actually happens, and then you don’t say whether anything is good or not. I think the proper kind of research is the mixture of both. It’s a mistake to say we should do this without knowing what the situation currently is. So you must have the facts before you make the choices. So I think the best kind of research is the research which does study the facts, and then make suggestions about what would appear to be the good things. But the end of the day, academics aren’t going to run anything, luckily. More practical people are going to actually do it. What we can give them I think, whether in UK, in America, or in China, is a little bit more understanding of what it is they are dealing with, what the experiences of other people in similar situations have been in other businesses, other industries, other times. That doesn’t seem to be the idea in some places really, —they think that academics shouldn’t get their hands dirty with real life but just write for each other to show how clever they are, you know.

I think at the end of the day, you should always be thinking “Why am I looking at this, what possible relevance uld it be to anybody who has to live their life?” I mean, although China has changed a lot, it is still true that what Karl Marx said was right, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.” I think that mbination of fact-based opinion—what we call in Britain now, it’s very fashionable now to talk about “evidence-based policymaking”. The ernment always gets a lot of ideas, they always say let’s get to do this, this is a wonderful initiative, this will win the election, blah blah blah. But they now say, “No, no, no, we have to have evidence-based policy.” So they do, they mmission research, and they want the research to tell them what is the situation, what are the possibilities, what are the likely nsequences if you do this or if you do that. At the end of the day they will decide, and they will decide for all sorts of other reasons, but that is the job of academics, is to provide as much as possible the inputs. As Deng Xiaoping said, “seek truth from facts”.

Macve教授：我想你得知道，我的经验可能不那么具有启示意义，因为这个世界变化得太快了，而且还在发生日新月异的变化。尽管如此，我想基本问题是不变的，有时人们会把研究分为实证研究和规范研究。他们说，规范研究只不过是发表关于你所认为的好主意的观点和看法，毫无实证可言，而实证研究是实际发生的事情，并且不对事情的好坏加以评判。我认为，最好的研究是两者的结合。不知道当前所处的情形就说我们应该做这做那，这是错误的，因此在你做选择之前必须要有一些事实为依据。因此，我认为最好的研究就是先对事实加以分析，然后在此基础上对事情好坏做出建议的研究。幸运的是，在一天结束之际，学者不会去做任何与企业运营相关的任何事情，更加务实的人才会去真正地实施。我想，我们所能给予他们的，无论是在英国、美国还是中国，只是对他们所从事的事情更深入一点的理解和认识，其他企业、其他行业或其他时期的其他人在类似情形下的经验是什么，仅此而已。有些观点认为，虽然在某些地方却不这么认为，学者不应该掺和现实生活，以免把手弄脏。但是我觉得让大家相互展示自己的聪明才智，这完全是可以的。

我想在一天结束之际，你应该总是在思考，“我为什么要研究这个？这对现实生活中的人又有什么启示？”我的意思是，尽管中国发生了很多变化，但是卡尔•马克思说的还是没错，“哲学家在努力了解这个世界，但是问题是改变它。”我认为这种事实和观点的结合，就是我们现在在英国非常流行的一个话题，基于实证的决策。政府总是有很多好点子，他们总是说，“我们做这个吧，这是一个非常好的倡议，这会为我们赢得选票，等等。”但是他们现在却说，“不不不，我们得基于证据来制定政策。”因此，他们就这样做，委托别人做研究，让研究告诉他们所处的情形，有哪些可能性，这样做或那样做可能的后果是什么。最终他们会决定，也会考虑很多其他方面的原因，但是学者的职责就是为政府决策提供尽可能多的参考信息，正如邓小平所说，咱们实事求是。

Li: Actually, I am thinking for an institute like Shanghai National Aounting Institute, definitely, we are different from, and we should be different from other traditional academic-oriented universities. Maybe that’s one of our priorities in our research, that is try to give some evidence-based suggestion for policymaking, for operation of various leading mpanies in China.

李院长：实际上，我想对于像上海国家会计学院这样的院校，我们肯定是，也应该是，和其他传统的学术导向的高校有所不同。也许我们研究工作的重点之一，就是给中国的各种龙头企业的决策和运营提供一些基于实证的建议。

Macve: I don’t know quite a lot of the details of what your missions are. I think initially when Premier Zhu set up the institutes, I mean, the argument was that there was nobody in China who knew anything about aounting, so in a sense it started in a very low level, just to train some people how to do some basic aounting. But as that has expanded, now that there are lots of people who know it, you uld raise the level that you are targeting. So you are now targeting at CFOs and boards of directors as well. So that means the level of the material you are giving them must be much higher, and once you get to that level, even you are not doing the same kind of academic research as SUFE, or Beida, you should be using their research in applying it to the materials that you pass on, because the businessmen are never going to read that research. But your people can, and so it will be the filter to say, well, 50% of research seems to be useless, but there is 50% which is quite useful if you think about it, you know. So I think that must be part of your mission, that is, maybe you are not going to do the most academic research, but what you do do or what you do pass on should be informed by the academic research that you are aware of. And your people, they are all cated in good universities, so they should be able to do some of that.

Macve教授：我对贵院的使命的细节不太了解。我想朱总理最初设立国家会计学院的时候，当时的论断是中国没有人懂会计，因此在某种意义上是从很低的层次开始的，只是培训人们做一些基础性会计工作。但是随着培训的进展，现在有了很多懂会计的人，你能提高你们设定的目标层次。因此，你们现在的目标培训对象是财务总监、董事会等等，这就是说，你们所给的教材的层次必须要高很多。一旦你们达到这个层次，即使你们做的研究和北大、财大不一样，你们也应该将它们的研究应用到给学生的课件中，因为商务人士自己是从来不会读那些研究的，但是你们的教职员工可以。根据惯常的经验，有一半的研究似乎是毫无用处的，但是还有一半是非常有用的，如果你加以思考的话。因此我想这一定是你们的使命的一部分，就是说，也许你们不会做最传统的学术研究，但是你们所做的研究，或者你们所讲授的内容，应该从你们所了解的传统学术研究中有所借鉴。你们的教职员工，他们都经受过良好的教育，因此他们做这个应该不成问题。

Li: What suggestion do you have for developing the aounting sector in China?

李院长：您对中国的会计行业发展有什么建议呢？

Macve: Well, it seems to be doing pretty well without my help, I think actually! I mean, something that went through my head the other day when we were talking about this initiative, about the Ministry wanting to push the development of management aounting. I mean I don’t know quite what they have in mind, but I think it would be a mistake to set up a kind of Institute for Management Aountants. I think if they have any such plans, my advice would be, “no no no, you want one institute for all the aountants called CICPA, but people can specialize in different areas of aounting.” So more like ICAEW, you have to do everything; you have to do management aounting, financial aounting, auditing, tax, plus some management subjects themselves like marketing and human relations among other things. So it’s a kind of mini-MBA type of qualification, but more oriented to actual practice. But then you can have specialisms and some special diplomas in management aounting or in financial management. I don’t know what the Ministry’s plans are. I would just say what you need to do, and that is nsistent I think, with the fact that CICPA at present is quite keen that audit firms should not just be audit firms, which they have been traditionally, but like in the West, they should be multi-disciplinary firms, and also provide other management services, nsulting, advise on management systems. It has its dangers, we know in the West, once it gets too big it might affect their audit judgment. But I don’t think that’s China’s problem yet, because it doesn’t yet have the level of skill. What the CICPA wants is for the Chinese firms to acquire greater skill in management advice.

That is good, I think, for a number of reasons. Partly in a sense, more interesting people will want to beme CPAs if the work they are going to do is not just checking audits, but giving management advice. It means that it is likely to be more attractive to the mpanies who later offer them management positions. So it attracts more interesting people into the profession. And in fact, certainly for more mplicated audits, you know you need those skills to be able to give a good audit opinion on the numbers as you need to understand what the business is about, if the strategy makes sense, if the marketing data is, you know, relevant, reliable, and appropriate, and whether the human relations situation is OK or it is going to have a terrible (well, maybe not in China, but in some places) a terrible strike next year that will s the whole thing. So understanding all the aspects of business is quite important for being able to give a good audit opinion on a large, mplicated mpany of the kind that the Chinese CICPA would like Chinese auditors to establish a reputation of being able to deal with.

So to me back to the original question, I would have thought, if I were the Minister of Finance, I would say what we need to enurage is the development of specialist, additional qualifications on of the CPA, not alternative qualifications. Don’t end up with rival institutes, you know, because you have had that in the 1990s and Premier Zhu was very wise and said, “we will s this and have one Institute for all aountants and auditors.”

Macve教授：我想，没有我的帮助，实际上你们也做得非常好。我是指，前几天当我们在谈论中国财政部想推动管理会计发展这件事时，我脑海里飘过的想法。我的意思是，我对财政部有什么想法并不太了解，但是我想为管理会计师建立一个协会这样的事情是不可取的。如果他们有这种计划的话，我的建议将是，“不，不，不，你只需要一个针对所有会计师的协会，也就是中国注册会计师协会，但是人们可以专注于不同的会计领域。”就像ICAEW一样，你们得样样都做，如管理会计、财务会计、审计、税务，以及一些管理科目，比如市场营销、人际关系，等等。因此，这就是类似于迷你MBA之类的资格证书，但是更偏向于实际应用。然后，你可以有一些管理会计或财务会计的专门方向和特殊学历证书。我不知道财政部的计划，我只是想说你们需要做什么。我想这也是与CICPA当前有关审计事务所的主张是一致的。CICPA坚持认为，审计事务所不应该只扮演传统意义上的审计事务所的角色。像西方一样，他们应该是涉及多个学科门类的公司，也提供其他的管理服务，做咨询，对管理体制提建议等。这样做当然也有风险。我们知道，在西方国家，一旦这些业务发展得太好，可能会影响其对审计的判断。但是我想中国当前还不会遇到这些问题，因为中国还不具备这个能力水平。CICPA想要的，就是让中国的事务所在管理咨询上能力更强。

我想这是很好的，无论从哪方面说。一方面，在某种意义上，如果CPA所从事的工作不仅仅是核查审计报告，而是给出管理建议，那么将有更多有趣的人士加入CPA的队伍。意思就是说，会计/审计事务所会更加有吸引力，会吸引更多有趣的人士进入这个行业。事实上，对于某些复杂程度更高的审计来说，你也需要这些技能来了解一个企业所从事的行业，并就一些有关企业的战略是否得当，营销数据是否相性、可性、恰当，企业的人员关系是否良好，是否会出现罢工等数据给出妥善的审计意见。也许中国不会出现罢工，但是在有些国家，下一年发生的一场严重罢工会让一切停滞不前。因此，了解企业的方方面面对能否给一家大型且复杂的企业给出妥善的审计意见至关重要。而中国的CICPA正是希望中国的审计事务所能胜任这种大型复杂企业的审计工作并以此建立名声。

那么回到我们最开始的问题，我会想，如果我是财政部长的话，我会说我们需要鼓励在CPA之上增设其他细分的专业资格证书，而不是另外单独开设这些资格证书。不要建立其他具有竞争关系的协会，因为你们在1990年曾经有过这种经历，朱总理很明智，他说，“我们将结束这种分割的局面，让所有的会计师和审计师只有一个协会。”

Li: But no matter what happened, as you said, since the world is changing very rapidly, the world the aountants will work in actually will beme more and more mplicated, so that means no matter what kind of aountants you are, you must work hard, study more systematically, study in a nstant way. So I guess in the future, we still need to learn from you, Professor.

李院长：但是无论发生了什么，正如你所说，因为这个世界在极速变化之中，会计师的工作环境会变得越来越复杂，也就是说，无论你是哪种类型的会计师，你必须努力工作，系统学习，持续不断地学习。因此我想未来我们还需要向您学习。

Macve: Well, I don’t know. Maybe I have said everything I have to say. I hope not.

Macve教授：恩，我不知道。也许我已经把我想要说的一切都说完了。我希望不要哦。

Li: Especially after you finish your study of the projects about China, we will be very interested to know the further findings of your research. Thank you very much.

李院长：尤其是在您完成关于中国的研究项目之后，我们会对您进一步的研究成果非常感兴趣。非常感谢您接受我们的采访。

Macve: Thank you very much for your invitation.

Macve教授：谢谢您的邀请。